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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, RICHARD CROWE, 
AND CHRISTINE MERRILL, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5075 
CITY OF GLENS FALLS, 
Employer, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Intervenor. 
CHRISTINE R. MERRILL, for Petitioner 
BARTLETT, PONTIFF, STEWART & RHODES, P.C. (L. LAWRENCE 
PALTROWITZ of counsel), for Employer 
TOM CAPONE, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On April 17, 2001, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation issued a decision in the above matter finding that the petition filed by 
Christopher Anderson, Richard Crowe and Christine Merrill (petitioners), employees of 
the City of Glens Falls (employer) to decertify the Public Employees Federation 
(intervenor) as negotiating representative for certain of its employees should be granted 
for lack of opposition.1 No exceptions have been filed to the decision. 
-The intervenor advised the Director by letter dated March 15, 2001, that it was 
"disclaiming interest in continued representation of the employees." 
Case No. C-5075 page 2 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Public Employees Federation be, and it 
hereby is, decertified as the negotiating representative of the following unit of 
employees of the employer: 
Included: Electrical Director, Cemetery Superintendent, WWTP Laboratory 
Chemist, Principal WWTP Operator, Chief WWTP Operator, 
Building Inspector, Plumbing Inspector, City Forester, Recreation 
Superintendent. 
Excluded: Assessor, Assistant City Attorney, Director of Transportation, 
Superintendent of Water/Sewer, Code Enforcement Officer and 
all other employees. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
'^IA^U^J^-C^ 
A\A ( • 
I John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLE COUNTRY LIBRARY EMPLOYEES' 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5067 
MIDDLE COUNTRY PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
DR. JOHN F. DE GREGORIO, for Petitioner 
FRANK & BRESLOW, P.C. (ALLEN B. BRESLOW of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 26, 2001, the Middle Country Library Employee's Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Middle Country Public Library 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and part-time Librarians. 
Excluded: Library Director, Assistant Director, Administrative Assistant, any 
individual who functions as Business Office Manager (presently a 
\ Case No. C-5067 - 2 -
Principal Library Clerk), and all other full-time and part-time 
employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on May 10, 2001, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner1. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
) New York, New York 
^4U.J2u^ 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
J 1Of the 54 ballots cast, 25 were for representation and 29 against representation. 
There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLE COUNTRY LIBRARY EMPLOYEES' 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-5068 
MIDDLE COUNTRY PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
DR. JOHN F. DE GREGORIO, for Petitioner 
FRANK & BRESLOW, P.C. ( ALLEN B. BRESLOW of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 26, 2001, the Middle Country Library Employees' Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Middle Country Public Library 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and part-time Clerks, Clerk Typists, Library Clerks, 
Principal Library Clerks, Senior Clerks, Career Counselors, 
Community Relations Assistants, Librarian Trainees, Library 
; 
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Assistants, Community Service Aides, Pages, Computer 
Technicians, Custodial Aides, Custodial Workers, Custodians, 
Head Custodians, Guards, Security Guards, and all other full-time 
and part-time employees not excluded below. 
Excluded: Library„Djrector^Assistant Director, Administrative Assistant, any 
individual who functions as Business Office Manager (presently a 
Principal Library Clerk), and all full-time and part-time Librarians. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on May 10, 2001, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner1. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member / 1 u 
10f the 145 ballots cast, 61 were for representation and 84 against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF STEUBEN, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-4994 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, STEUBEN 
COUNTY UNIT OF STEUBEN COUNTY LOCAL #851, 
Intervenor. 
FREDERICK H. AHRENS, JR., COUNTY ATTORNEY (TERI WEAVER of 
counsel), for Employer/Petitioner 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BAISLEY of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Steuben (County) to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its representation petition 
which sought to fragment certain supervisory titles from a unit of County employees 
represented by the Civil Service Employees' Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Steuben County Unit of Steuben County Local #851 (CSEA). The ALJ found 
that the at-issue titles were only mid-level supervisors of other unit titles and that there 
was no evidence that there was or had been a subversion of their supervisory 
responsibilities such as to create a conflict of interest warranting the removal of the 
supervisors from the unit. As to certain nursing supervisors in the bargaining unit, the 
- and -
Board - C-4994 -2 
ALJ found, contrary to the County's argument, that there was no evidence that CSEA 
had attempted to intimidate, undermine or retaliate against them that would compel a 
finding of inadequate representation. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ committed errors 
_—_Qf_fa.cLa.odJaw. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The County filed the petition which, as amended, sought the removal of fifty-
three supervisors from an overall unit of approximately 762 County employees.1 The 
County argued that the supervisors perform high level supervisory functions which 
causes a conflict of interest with the rank-and-file employees they supervise. The 
County further points to two incidents involving a supervising public health nurse, 
Kathyron Maine, and the CSEA Labor Relations Specialist, Teri Menkiena, as 
evidencing a subversion of supervisory responsibility by CSEA and inadequate 
representation warranting the fragmentation of all of the at-issue titles from the CSEA 
bargaining unit. 
The ALJ provides a thorough recitation and analysis of all relevant facts in her 
decision.2 Only the facts necessary for our decision are repeated here. 
1CSEA was recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit in 
1969 or 1970. Employees of the Sheriff's Department were fragmented from the unit in 
1986, upon a finding that the Sheriff and the County were joint employers of those 
employees. 
2County of Steuben, 34 PERB fl4008 (2001). 
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The County is a non-charter County; as such, the legislature and legislative 
committees have the ultimate authority overemployment issues. The legislature 
ultimately hires and fires County employees. The county administrator coordinates the 
day-to-day operations of the County. Under the county administrator are the various 
commissioners or department heads of the County departments. The directors of the 
divisions within the departments report to the commissioner or department head. The 
directors are unrepresented.3 The titles at issue here are the next level of supervision 
over the rank-and-file and report to the directors. They provide the first level of 
supervision over subordinate titles and over clerical and support titles. For example, 
Mark Alger is the commissioner of the County's Department of Social Services. The 
various directors within that department report to him. Supervisory personnel, such as 
case supervisors, report to the directors. Caseworkers and senior caseworkers report to 
the case supervisor, who would also exercise supervisory responsibility over any 
support personnel assigned to the unit. 
Supervisors make daily assignments based upon workload and geographic 
location, where relevant. Supervisors keep track of attendance, sign leave requests and 
provide the first level of review of their subordinates' work. They may not approve 
overtime requests, which are sent to the directors. The supervisor is responsible for 
completing the County employee evaluation form for each employee under his or her 
supervision. Supervisors may also interview candidates for vacancies within their unit. 
3One employee, Martha Ober, Child Support Enforcement Unit (CSEU) 
Coordinator in the Department of Social Services, is a director level and is in the 
bargaining unit. 
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They make recommendations to the director who makes recommendations to the 
commissioner or department head on hiring. Supervisors may also complete an 
Employer Incident Report. The Incident Report is not a form of discipline, but may be 
used in subsequent disciplinary proceedings. It is signed by the supervisor and the 
director and covers any one of several potential infractions, such as tardiness, 
insubordination, safety violations, drug or alcohol abuse, personal appearance, and 
lack of cooperation, among others. Supervisors are normally in attendance when an 
Incident Report is given to an employee by a director. 
The ALJ, in her decision, describes in great detail the Administrative Code of the 
County of Steuben (Code) and the County-CSEA collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA). The Code is a detailed document setting forth the County's procedures 
governing most employment rules and regulations. As a result of the Code and the 
CBA, there is very little room for the exercise of discretion by supervisory personnel in 
the areas of attendance, leave, compensation, evaluations, and discipline. 
As a result of the facts and circumstances surrounding an improper practice 
charge filed by CSEA against the County in 1998, the County further alleged that CSEA 
had intimidated and harassed a nursing supervisor to a degree that warranted the 
fragmentation of all supervisors from the CSEA unit. That charge, which was decided 
by us in 20004, involved an allegation that the County had changed the geographic 
location of the work assignment of two County Public Health Nurses in retaliation for 
their filing of grievances challenging work schedules of public health nurses. Maine was 
^County of Steuben, 33 PERB P030 (2000). 
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one of the nursing supervisors who testified on behalf of the County that the work 
assignments were made by her and another nursing supervisor as a result of 
redistribution of territory assignments among three offices. The improper practice 
charge was dismissed. 
lDj.u.aeJ-9J9j9.^ shortLy_after.th_at charge was filed, Maine told a nurse in her office 
who was returning from extended leave to report to her first when she came back to 
work. The nurse contacted Menkiena to be with her for the meeting with Maine. When 
Maine entered her office and saw Menkiena there, she asked Menkiena to leave. 
Menkiena refused. The two exchanged words and, thereafter, Maine filed a complaint 
against Menkiena with CSEA. Menkiena's actions were upheld by CSEA. There is also 
testimony that a female calling from Menkiena's telephone in June 2000 to Maine's 
home made derogatory remarks about Maine to her husband.5 
DISCUSSION 
It is our long-standing policy that we will not fragment existing bargaining units 
absent compelling evidence of the need to do so.6 In reviewing a fragmentation petition 
to remove supervisors from a mixed unit of supervisors and rank-and-file employees, 
our primary focus is on the nature and level of supervisory functions performed by the 
supervisory employees sought to be fragmented.7 
5The ALJ's decision discusses these events in reverse order. We have placed 
them in the proper chronological order and have considered them in that context. 
6
 See State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreation and Historical 
Preservation Commission), 22 PERB ^3043 (1989). 
) 
7See County of Genesee, 29 PERB 1J3068 (1996). 
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Utilizing the standard articulated in County of Genesee, supra, (hereafter, 
Genesee) the ALJ determined that the supervisors here are mid-level supervisors. As in 
Genesee, the supervisors who are the subject of this petition do not have a supervisory 
role in hiring, discharge, promotion or grievance administration. The County argues in 
its exceptions that the supervisors do have a role in hiring, discharge and promotion 
which is higher than the role of the supervisors in Genesee. While the record reflects 
that the supervisors in this case have input into hiring, discharge of probationary 
employees and promotion, it is in the form of recommendations to their superiors who 
are the final decision-makers in these areas. That their recommendations are routinely 
followed does not invest them with higher authority.8 
In Uniondale Union Free School District9 (hereafter, Uniondale), we found that 
department chairpersons with the same and greater supervisory responsibilities as the 
supervisors here were not appropriately fragmented from a long-standing unit of 
teachers and department chairpersons. The County, however, urges us to follow 
County of Ulster,™ where the County's petition to remove thirty-three supervisors from 
an overall County unit was granted. There, the supervisors were found to perform a full-
range of supervisory functions, such as assigning work and overtime, interviewing 
prospective employees, making effective recommendations for hiring, promotion and 
8See City of Schenectady, 19 PERB 1J3027 (1986). 
920 PERB 1J3027 (1987), annulled and remitted, 140 AD2d 612, 21 PERB <[7012 
(2d Dep't 1988), on remand 21 PERB ^3060 (1988), intervention ordered and 
transferred, 22 PERB 1J7010 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, 1989), appeal withdrawn, 23 
PERB 1J7004 (2d Dep't 1990). 
1016 PERB H3069 (1983). 
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discipline and approving requests for sick and vacation time. However, the details of 
their responsibilities were not spelled out in any detail in either the Board's decision or 
the decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation.11 
We find the discussion of the supervisory responsibilities in Uniondale provides 
better guidance in reaching a decision as to whether to fragment supervisory titles from 
a long-standing unit of supervisory and rank-and-file employees. There we noted that 
while the issues may appear to be the same in cases of this type, such cases required 
an analysis of the facts of each case. Here, the supervisors sought to be fragmented 
are the first level of supervision in the unit. There are several levels of supervision 
above them. Their roles in signing time sheets, granting leave requests, filling out 
evaluations and Incident Reports and assigning work are severely circumscribed by the 
) 
CBA and the Code. While these supervisors play a role in evaluations and counseling 
of employees and have, at times, found themselves at odds with unit members whom 
they supervise, as we found in Genesee: 
We are not unmindful... that the direction and evaluation 
functions can and have caused tensions between 
supervisors and subordinates, the latter at least perceiving 
the direction and evaluation as criticism or as actions which 
can lead to discipline or other adverse personnel actions. 
There are, however, multiple sources of tension within a 
workplace cutting across all levels of employees. Unless we 
were to establish a perse supervisory exclusion rule, which 
we never have been willing to do, tensions, real or imagined, 
stemming from supervisor-subordinate relationships are not 
entitled to more weight in making a unit determination than 
) 1116PERB 1J4035 (1983). 
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any other of the myriad sources of workplace pressures and 
strains which can affect employees.12 
We find that none of the supervisory responsibilities of the at-issue employees 
warrants their fragmentation from this long-standing unit. Neither does the fact that 
there have been conflicts within the unit between supervisors and the employees they 
supervise. We refer specifically to the prior improper practice charge.13 A union at times 
may be required to represent the interests of one group of unit employees over another 
group of unit employees.14 Such an action provides insufficient grounds for fragmenting 
a group of employees from a unit in effect for over thirty years. 
The final ground for the County's petition is the treatment by Menkiena of Maine 
during their clash in Maine's office in 1999 and the phone call made from Menkiena's 
telephone to Maine's home in 2000.15 The dispute in Maine's office does not rise to the 
level of inadequate representation of Maine, individually, or the supervisors, as a group. 
There was a misunderstanding over the purpose of the meeting and a disagreement 
™Supm, note 7 at 3160. 
™Supra, note 4. 
14See UFT, Local 2, AFT, 18 PERB 1J3048 (1985); South Huntington United 
Aides, 17 PERB 1(3012 (1984); State of New York and PEF, AFL-CIO, 14 PERB 1J3043 
(1981). 
15At the hearing, the County introduced into evidence three documents which it 
asserted established CSEA's attempts to intimidate or undermine the at-issue 
supervisors. The ALJ declined to accept the exhibits into evidence as the petition filed 
by the County did not specifically allege the events memorialized by the documents. 
The County has taken exception to the ALJ's ruling. We hereby affirm the ALJ's ruling. 
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about Menkiena's role. Such incidents do not evidence the level of inadequate 
representation that is necessary to fragment supervisors from an overall unit.16 
As to the telephone call to Maine's residence, such harassment certainly is not to 
be countenanced and we find such a personal attack on a unit member by a paid 
rjepxesmtativeioLthej^ 
representation owed by the bargaining agent to each unit member. But that one phone 
call, never linked to Menkiena directly,17 does not compel the fragmentation of the 
nursing supervisors or all unit supervisors, as argued by the County. The County points 
to our decision in East Greenbush Central School District (hereafter, East Greenbush)™ 
as support for its contention that all supervisors should be fragmented from the overall 
unit. In that case, we fragmented all supervisors from an overall unit because the union 
president had attempted to pressure one supervisor during a conversation to change 
his supervisory style and practices. We considered this conversation to have been 
intended by the union to serve as a warning to all supervisors that they must 
accommodate the union's wishes in the exercise of their supervisory responsibilities. 
We do not find the clash in Maine's office or the telephone call to rise to the level 
of the unit president's tactics in East Greenbush. The two incidents do not evidence 
such a level of subversion of supervisory function to warrant the fragmentation of all 
16See County of Erie and Erie Co. Sheriff, 17 PERB 1J4006, aff'd, 17 PERB 
113036(1984). 
17Maine's husband testified that the call was traced to Menkiena's personal 
telephone number. Menkiena did not testify at the hearing and there was no other 
evidence directly linking Menkiena to the call. 
17 PERB 1J3083(1984). 
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supervisors from the existing unit.19 As to the remaining arguments of the County not 
specifically discussed herein, we have found them to be without merit. 
Based on the foregoing, the County's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS. THEREFORE. ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
iof in T. Mitchell, Member 
19See State of New York, 21 PERB 1J3050 (1988). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF OTSEGO CASE NO. E-2221 
Upon~the-AppIieation~fer-Designation-of-Persons 
as Managerial or Confidential. 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN M. MONAHAN of counsel), for 
Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Otsego (County) to 
the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision, after a hearing, which dismissed its 
application to designate Catherine Crist, Assistant Director of Nursing Services at the 
Meadows,1 as a confidential employee pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County objects to the ALJ's findings of fact. The Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), the bargaining 
representative for the unit which includes the at-issue title, supports the ALJ's decision. 
1The Meadows is a 774-bed skilled nursing facility operated by the County. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
CSEA represents the entire nursing staff at the Meadows with the exception of 
the Director of Nursing, Judith Pierce. CSEA previously stipulated to the exclusion of 
the Director of Nursing title from the bargaining unit during the 1985-86 collective 
bargaining negotiations. Since 1986, the County has never filed an application to 
designate the title of Director of Nursing as managerial. 
At the hearing, the Meadows' Administrator, Kurt Apthorpe, testified that he does 
not participate in collective bargaining negotiations.2 His role in collective bargaining 
was limited to submitting a "wish list" of proposals to the negotiating team.3 Personnel 
functions are shared with the County Personnel Officer.4 Labor relations functions are 
carried out by the Personnel Officer.5 
Pierce testified that she, too, plays no role in collective bargaining and 
negotiations.6 Her policy role is limited to developing policies for the nursing 
department.7 Her role with regard to hiring is limited to making a recommendation to 
2Tr. p. 52. 
3Tr. p. 54. 
4Tr. p. 90. 
5Tr. p. 87. 
6Tr. p. 109. 
7Tr. p. 120. 
Board - E-2221 -3 
the Administrator.8 She has no authority to terminate an employee's employment.9 
She is the first step of the unit's grievance procedure. 
The Assistant Director of Nursing, Catherine Crist, testified that she functions as 
the resident care coordinator.10 In that capacity, at least half of her time is involved with 
resident care issues.11 Her access to personnel files is limited to about once or twice a 
month. She accesses the files based on need.12 The nursing supervisors, as well as 
the secretary of the nursing department, also have access to the personnel files.13 Her 
personnel duties, as they relate to discipline of subordinate employees have not 
changed from her previous title as a supervising nurse.14 
DISCUSSION 
In situations such as this where the managerial employee (Director of Nursing) 
has not been formally designated managerial by us, we look to the duties that 
employee performs. We are guided by §201.7(a) of the Act, which states in pertinent 
part: 
...[E]mployees may be designated as managerial only if they are persons 
(i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may reasonably be required on behalf 
of the public employer to assist directly in the preparation for and conduct 
8Tr. p. 121. 
9Tr. p. 122. 
10Tr. p. 127. 
11Tr. p. 153. 
12Tr. p. 133. 
13Tr. p. 133. 
14Tr. p. 152. 
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of collective negotiations or have a major role in the administration of 
agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is not of 
a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent 
judgment. Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are 
persons who assist and act in a confidential capacity to managerial 
employees described in clause (ii). 
We have previously stated the policy underlying the 1971 Amendment to the Act, 
to wit: "[l]t was not the intention of the Legislature to increase substantially the number 
of employees designated as managerial or confidential... It [the Amendment] 
expressed a legislative caution to this Board that the statutory criteria should be applied 
conservatively in order to preserve existing negotiating units."15 
This policy has been embodied in our decisions.16 Thus, an employee is 
confidential only when, in the course of assisting a managerial employee who exercises 
labor relations responsibilities, that employee has access to personnel/labor relations 
information on a regular basis which is not appropriate for the eyes and ears of rank 
and file personnel or their negotiating representative.17 
The ALJ found that the County had not formally designated Pierce's title 
(Director of Nursing) managerial. Consequently, he had to examine Pierce's duties in 
order to satisfy the requirements of the Act that the superior of the allegedly confidential 
person clearly performs managerial duties.18 Based upon our review of Pierce's 
testimony, we conclude, as did the ALJ, that Pierce is a "highly skilled, highly 
^State of New York, 5 PERB 1J3001 (1972), at 3004. 
16
 See North Rose-Wolcott Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3002 (2000); Town of 
Dewitt, 32 PERB 1(3001 (1999); State of New York (Unified Court System), 30 PERB 
3067 (1997), conf'd sub nom. Lippman v. PERB, 263 AD2d 891, 32 PERB 1J7017 (3d 
Dep't1999). 
17See North Rose-Wolcott Cent. Sch. Dist, supra, note 16. 
See Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB 1J3059 (1986). 
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experienced [Director]" who oversees the nursing division of the Meadows, however, 
since she has no independent role in collective negotiations or personnel 
administration, she does not meet the criteria established by the Act for managerial 
status.19 Furthermore, we find no support for concluding that the Director of Nursing is 
a^manageriaLemployee„or the confidential designation of the Assistant Director of 
Nursing Services from the County representative, Apthorpe, who testified that it was not 
his decision to petition for the confidential designation of Crist.20 
Having found that Pierce is not a managerial employee within the meaning of the 
Act, Crist cannot be designated confidential based upon the duties she performs as 
Pierce's assistant. We concur with the ALJ that the application must be dismissed. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the application must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
I R. Cueyas, Chajrana 
arc A. Abbott, Membe 
John T. Mitchell, Member ( I 
19See State of New York (Unified Court System), supra, note 16. 
20Tr. p. 83. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOEL FREDERICSON, 
Charging-Party,— 
- and - CASE NO. U-19228 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL FREDERICSON, Pro se 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(DANIEL TOPPER of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Joel Fredericson has filed exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge that he filed against the New York City 
Transit Authority (Authority) alleging that the Authority violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it suspended and disciplined 
him in retaliation for events resulting from Fredericson's inspection of a work site on 
April 11,1997 while a member of the Transport Workers Union (TWU) Safety 
Committee. 
By decision dated June 4, 1999,1 the ALJ dismissed the charge in its entirety, on 
the ground that Fredericson had not been disciplined for engaging in a protected 
132 PERB H4581 (1999). 
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activity. The ALJ found, instead, that Fredericson's actions as a TWU safety officer lost 
their protected status when he directed a work crew to stop working. The ALJ found 
this conduct to be in the nature of a work stoppage and, therefore, prohibited by §210.1 
of the Act. In addition, the ALJ found that Fredericson was collaterally estopped by the 
diseiplinaty_arbitratiQn_awarj^^ 
motivated by a good faith belief that the work being performed was unsafe. 
By decision dated October 21, 1999, we reversed the ALJ. We held that it was 
error for the ALJ to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the issue of Fredericson's 
good faith. Consequently, we remanded the case to the ALJ to consider evidence of 
whether Fredericson acted in good faith and whether any witness was improperly 
precluded from testifying. Also, we held that the ALJ should consider whether the • 
amended charge sufficiently pled that taking pictures of the alleged unsafe conditions at 
the job site on April 11,1997 was a protected activity under the Act for which the 
Authority unlawfully disciplined Fredericson.2 
Pursuant to our remand, the ALJ elected to reopen the record and held hearings 
on February 17, June 20 and 21, 2000, at which time the parties were given an 
opportunity to present evidence on the remanded issues. 
By decision dated March 16, 2001, the ALJ found Fredericson did not have a 
good faith belief that the work was being performed under unsafe conditions, but that 
the Authority violated the Act when it disciplined Fredericson for returning to the tracks 
to take photographs.3 
232PERB 1J3057 (1999). 
334PERB H4528(2001). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Fredericson has excepted to the ALJ's decision of March 16, 2001, based upon 
her findings of fact and conclusions of law as they relate to establishing a good faith 
standard. 
The Authority has filed cross-exceptions based upon the ALJ's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law which resulted in a finding of a violation. 
Fredericson filed a reply to the Authority's cross-exceptions setting forth various 
legal and factual arguments in rebuttal. 
FACTS 
A full discussion of the salient facts appears in the ALJ's first decision.4 The 
testimony and documentary evidence adduced at the later hearings is discussed in the 
ALJ's decision of March 16, 2001.5 
The facts which can be distilled from the evidence reveal that, since 1991, Joel 
Fredericson has been a TWU member of the track division safety committee and, as 
such, he is granted release time to work as a TWU representative. He, therefore, 
responds to safety complaints and initiates contractual safety complaints. 
While on duty on April 11, 1997, Fredericson received a telephone call from 
Roger Toussaint, the chair of the track safety committee, who instructed him to 
investigate a safety complaint. Fredericson went to the site of the complaint and spoke 
with Douglas Endall, a supervisor in charge of the work. Fredericson was allowed to 
432 PERB U4581 (1999). 
5Supra, note 3. 
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inspect the job site. Fredericson asked Endall to increase the "flagging" protection at 
the work site. In an effort to appease Fredericson, Endall agreed to assign one of the 
track workers to serve as a flagger. 
The problem arose when Fredericson requested a second flagman. This request 
jiV-as_b,as.ed_u.pon_F_redericson's reliance upon Federal law (Federal Railway Act) even 
though he knew that Federal law did not apply to the Transit Authority,6 and not upon 
any expressed concern of the workers for their safety.7 
While Fredericson disputed the Authority's version of what happened next, 
especially that Endall refused his second request, the ALJ credited the Authority's 
witness, Endall. He testified that Fredericson got angry and threatened to "close down" 
the job. At that point, Fredericson told the track workers to put their tools down and "go 
to the platform". Endall then ordered Fredericson "out of service", thereby suspending 
him. It was Endall's position that only a supervisor can decide whether to stop work 
and, therefore, Fredericson was ordered out of service because he declared a job 
action unrelated to his safety functions. 
Fredericson was later served with a Notice of Discipline (DAN). The various 
steps of the disciplinary grievance process were followed and culminated in a hearing 
before a Tripartite Arbitration Board (TAB).8 The TAB sustained the charges. The 
arbitration award credits Endall's testimony that Fredericson told him: "If you do not put 
6Transcript pp. 145-146. 
7Id. at 149. 
8A member from TWU and a member from the Authority, as well as an 
independent arbitrator, sit on the TAB. The independent arbitrator is responsible for 
writing and issuing the award. 
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another flagman there, I will shut the job down", and that Fredericson told a work crew 
to "stop working" because he was "shutting down the job" and they should "go to the 
platform".9 
DISCUSSION 
Since we found in our earlier decision that the ALJ erroneously concluded that 
the issue of whether Fredericson acted in good faith had been resolved against him by 
the TAB, the ALJ was to consider, on remand, this issue as well as whether 
Fredericson's conduct in taking pictures of the work site was a protected activity for 
which he was unlawfully disciplined. 
After resuming testimony on the remanded issues, the ALJ reached the 
conclusion that Fredericson was not acting in good faith when he directed the track 
workers to stop working. We agree and adopt the ALJ's factual findings that under no 
circumstances could Fredericson have concluded, using any objective standard, that 
the track workers were in imminent danger to their safety. We, therefore, find that the 
Authority did not violate the Act when it filed disciplinary charges against Fredericson 
for his attempt to stop the workers. 
Turning to the remaining issue, we disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that 
Fredericson was engaged in a protected activity when he returned to the work site to 
take photographs for which he was unlawfully disciplined. 
While testimony at the hearing before the ALJ is controverted, the finding of the 
impartial TAB regarding specification No. 3, refusing multiple directives to leave transit 
9Supra, note 1 at 4784. 
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property, remains, to wit: "[a] majority of the board finds this charge sustained. While 
other questions on this specification are contested, [Fredericson] concedes that after 
Mr. Endall took him out of service and told him to leave, he returned to the tracks to 
take photographs. He should not have done that."10 This finding by the TAB is 
supported by Fredericson's testimony: 
Q. I think you have testified that you took photos after you were 
asked to leave the property by Mr. Endall, you went back on 
the tracks and took photos? 
A. That's right.11 
We have held that in order to establish improper motivation under §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act, a charging party must prove that (a) he/she had been engaged in 
protected activities, (b) the respondent had knowledge of, and (c) acted because of 
those activities.12 If the charging party proves a prima facie case of improper 
motivation, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish that its 
actions were motivated by legitimate business reasons.13 
We have held that the charging party can establish "[t]he existence of anti-union 
animus . . . by statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by 
presentation of legitimate business reasons for the actions taken, unless found to be 
10Tripartite Arbitration Award, Joint Ex. #1. 
"Transcript, p. 199. 
12Tow? of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1990). See also Convention Ctr. 
Operating Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB |f3067 (1995), conf'd, 
234 AD2d 640, 29 PERB fi7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
nCity of Salamanca, 18 PERB P012 (1985). See also City of Albany, 3 PERB 
1J4507, aff'd, 3 PERB H3096 (1970), confirmed in pertinent part, 36 AD2d 348, 4 PERB 
H7008 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 NY2d 433, 5 PERB 1J7000 (1972). 
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pretextual".14 Proof that the employer's stated reasons for its conduct are pretextual 
may constitute such circumstantial evidence.15 
Fredericson meets the first two prongs of the test because he was acting in his 
capacity as a TWU representative at the time he inspected the work site on April 11, 
1997 and the Authority was aware of Fredericson's membership and his position with 
the safety committee. However, we disagree with the ALJ's decision that the Authority 
would not have brought the third specification of the disciplinary charges but for his 
protected activity. 
We have held that the fundamental right of an employee to participate in the 
activities of the employee organization of his choosing and the employer's right to 
maintain order and respect must be balanced one against the other:16 
"On occasion, the [union] representative may engage in 
impulsive behavior that an employer would not have to 
tolerate from an employee who is engaged in his normal 
tasks. Although an employer may not ordinarily discipline 
the employee representative for such behavior, there are 
circumstances in which overzealous behavior on his part 
may constitute misconduct."17 
147OWA7 of Independence, supra note 12, at 3038. 
15See CityofUtica, 24 PERB 1J3044 (1991); Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB fi4605, 
aff'd, 28 PERB P079 (1995). 
wState of New York (Ben Aaman), 11 PERB 1J3084 (1978). 
17/d. at 3137. See also NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F2d 584 (7th Cir. 
1965). 
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Consequently, inappropriate conduct, even if part of a union activity which is 
protected, will not shield an employee from its consequences.18 
It is uncontroverted that Endall directed Fredericson to cease and leave the work 
site. Fredericson finally left the work site, but he later returned, not to further seek a 
Jworlc.stoppaga,_butioJakapM 
direct disregard of Endall's directive that he vacate the area, that prompted the action 
taken against him. The question is thus presented: does Fredericson's return to a work 
site that he was ordered to leave violate that directive? We find that it does. Implicit in 
Endall's directive to Fredericson was an order that Fredericson not return to the work 
site.19 
Fredericson offers no meritorious explanation for his refusal to comply with 
Endall's order. We have held that the appropriate response to an objectionable 
directive is to comply and seek redress through available legal channels.20 We find, 
therefore, that Fredericson's return to the work site was a refusal to comply with 
™Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3022 (1994); State of New York 
(OMRDD), 24 PERB 1J3036 (1991); Island Trees Public Sens., 14 PERB 1J3020 (1981). 
See also Earle Industries v. NLRB, 75 F3d 400 (8th Cir. 1996). 
19lt is not the taking of the photographs that we find is unprotected activity. It is 
Fredericson's return to the work site after attempting a work stoppage and in direct 
contravention of Endall's order absent facts that would demonstrate any compelling 
need to return to the work site that day. But see NYCTA (Sorrentino), 19 PERB P021 
(1986), where we found a violation when an employee representative was disciplined 
for taking photographs of allegedly unsafe conditions. 
See Farmingdale Union Free Sch. Dist, 11 PERB ^3055 (1978). 
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Endall's directive and was tantamount to misconduct, even though clothed in protected 
activity.21 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we deny Fredericson's exceptions as to the ALJ's finding that he did not act 
in good faith when he attempted to stop the work on the track and we affirm the ALJ in 
that regard. We find no evidence of anti-union animus and we grant, therefore, the 
Authority's exceptions. We reverse the ALJ's decision on this issue. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
Michael, R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^ arc A. Abbott, Member 
l6hni T. Mitchell, Member 
(1992). 
^Plante v. Buono, 172 AD2d 81 (3d Dep't 1991), appeal denied, 79 NY2d 756 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HELEN KRESZ, 
Charging-Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22249 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
HELEN KRESZ, pro se 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Helen Kresz to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing her 
improper practice charge which alleged that the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District) had violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it required her to record her time in and 
out of the school to which she was assigned as a teacher of English as a Second 
Language (ESL). The details of the charge also allege that Kresz was denied 
representation by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) at the Education Law 
§3020-a hearing held on the charges brought by the District against Kresz to have her 
employment terminated for failing to comply with its attendance requirements.1 
1Although UFT was not named specifically as a respondent on the face of the 
charge, Kresz had checked the box on the improper practice charge form indicating a 
Board - U-22249 -2 
Kresz was notified by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) that the charge was deficient as it was untimely, 
failed to set forth a clear and concise statement of the facts in support of the charge, 
failed to name UFT as a respondent, and no facts were alleged which would support a 
finding of improper motivation on the part of the District or that the UFT had been 
arbitrary, discriminatory or acting in bad faith. To the extent that Kresz alleged that the 
conduct of the arbitrator at the §3020-a hearing violated her rights, the Assistant 
Director informed her that PERB did not have jurisdiction over the conduct of an 
arbitrator at a §3020-a hearing. 
Kresz responded with numerous documents, including the transcript of her 
§3020-a hearing, comprising several hundred pages. Some of the documents are 
duplicates and many of them contain notations in what appears to be Kresz's 
handwriting. Kresz was informed that her submissions had failed to correct the 
deficiencies with the charge. The Director thereafter dismissed the charge against both 
the District and UFT as untimely and as failing to plead facts which would support a 
finding of the alleged violations.2 
In her exceptions, Kresz argues that the Director erred in finding the charge to be 
untimely and in finding that no facts had been properly pled that would support a finding 
of a violation of the Act.3 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act and had named UFT in the details of the charge. 
2The allegation against the arbitrator was summarily dismissed as an improper 
practice charge can only be filed against a public employer or an employee 
organization. ATU, Local 1056 (Rodriguez), 24 PERB P008 (1991). 
3The District requested an extension of time to file a response to the exceptions. 
As the request was untimely, it was denied. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of arguments made, 
we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Kresz confuses the extension of time granted to her by the Assistant Director to 
file the clarification of her charge with the time limits for filing an improper practice 
charge_setiorthjn_§20A._1Xa)^ 
clarification was filed within the time frame set by the Assistant Director, the original 
improper practice charge was not timely filed. From the documents submitted in support 
of the charge, it appears that the requirement that Kresz sign in and out was 
implemented sometime in 1999. The charge as against the District was filed on 
December 26, 2000, more than four months after the action upon which the charge 
against the District is based. The charge against the District was, therefore, properly 
dismissed as untimely. 
As against UFT, the crux of Kresz's charge is that UFT withdrew as her 
representative before the scheduled disciplinary arbitration hearing and failed to advise 
her that she would be liable for the arbitrator's fee if UFT did not represent her at the 
hearing. By letter dated May 31, 2000, UFT informed Kresz that it would no longer 
represent her due to her failure to cooperate in the preparation of her case.5 As Kresz's 
improper practice charge against UFT was filed more that four months after the receipt 
of the letter, it also was properly dismissed as untimely. 
4
"With respect to the timeliness issue, it is clear that a charging party must file an 
improper practice charge within four months of its knowledge of the alleged improper 
practice." New York State ThruwayAuth. v. Cuevas, 34 PERB 1J7003, at 7004 (3d Dep't 
2001). 
5To the extent that there was any obligation to specifically inform Kresz when 
UFT withdrew as counsel that she would be liable for all of the arbitrator's fees if she 
sought an adjournment of the §3020-a hearing, the charge is also untimely. 
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The Director also properly dismissed the charge for failure to plead facts which, if 
proven, would support the finding of a violation of §209-a.1(a) or §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
Kresz does not plead any facts which link an exercise of protected rights on her part to 
the District's decision to have her sign in and sign out of school.6 Nor does the charge 
plead any facts which would establish that UFT's actions were arbitrary, discriminatory 
or taken in bad faith.7 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. AbbottTlvlember 
^ohh T. Mitchell, Member 
6See NYCTA (Andre), 32 PERB 1J3061 (1999). 
7See Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York (Freedman), 
33 PERB 1J3062 (2000). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, UNITED MARINE DIVISION INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 342, United Marine Division, 
International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
CASE NO. C-5032 
Certification - C-5032 - 2 
Included: Lifeguard, senior lifeguard, and assistant chief lifeguard. 
Excluded: Chief lifeguard and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
^negatiatexollectivelyjiMithJh 
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
U^AsstM*jJ()<:<±^^ 
ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 693, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5074 
TOWN OF LISLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 693, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5074 - 2 -
Included: M.E.O.H. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
-negotiatexollactivBlyjM^ 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
MicHkel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-5087 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described beiow, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
-and-
TOWN OF HERKIMER, 
Certification - C-5087 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and part-time Heavy Equipment Operators, Medium 
Equipment Operators, Light Equipment Operators, Mechanics and 
Laborers. 
Excluded: Seasonal Employees and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 182, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/Jcihn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5083 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 264 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of coliective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5083 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and regular part-time detention aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 264. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
LAS\S*^T~CU*J>Q?!^*~J^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioners 
-and- CASE NO. C-5070 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
) Certification - C-5070 - 2 
Included: All Security Aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
L4*As**d!st~6U^/ ^~^»—A*-4L^. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc ANAbbottrMember 
J/Shri T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BETHLEHEM POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5097 
TOWN OF BETHLEHEM, 
Employer, 
-and-
TOWN OF BETHLEHEM POLICE UNION, 
LOCAL 3364, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected1, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
-This unit has been represented by the Town of Bethlehem Police Union, Local 3364, 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, who notified PERB that it disclaims any interest in 
further representing the unit. 
Certification - C-5097 - 2 -
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Bethlehem Police Benevolent Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All employees in the following titles: Police Officer, Police Sergeant, 
Police Detective and Detective Supervisor. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Deputy Chief of Police, Captains, Lieutenants and 
all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Bethlehem Police Benevolent Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 June 27,2001 ,, r\ S~~\ 
New York, New York w W . / $ IS ( , S*"^ 
/ *7Marc X AJ5b6tt, Member* 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5047 
WEST BABYLON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union, has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees in the above named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Board - C-5047 -2 
Included: All pages. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
_nBgoliatejcoJlj3£liyje^ 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2001 
New York, New York 
- ^ l ^ U ^ c ^ ^ ^ - ^ -
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Jqfhn T. Mitchell, Member 
